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An optical implementation of quantum bit commitment using infinite-dimensional
systems
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School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) was widely believed to be impossible for
more than two decades. But recently, basing on an anomalous behavior found in quantum steering,
we proposed a QBC protocol which can be unconditionally secure in principle. The protocol requires
the use of infinite-dimensional systems, thus it may seem less feasible at first glance. Here we show
that such infinite-dimensional systems can be implemented with quantum optical methods, and
propose an experimental scheme using Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography had achieved great success
in many fields such as key distribution [1], but there
are still other cryptographic problems remained uncon-
quered. Bit commitment (BC) [2] is known to be an
essential building block for coin tossing [1], oblivious
transfer [3, 4], and even more complicated multi-party
secure computation protocols [5]. Unfortunately, since
1996 there were constantly proofs showing that uncon-
ditionally secure quantum BC (QBC) is impossible [6–
41] . This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC)
no-go theorem, was widely accepted despite of some at-
tempts towards secure QBC (e.g., [42–46] and the refer-
ences therein).
Nevertheless, the cheating strategy in all these no-go
proofs are based on the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW)
theorem [47], a.k.a. the Uhlmann theorem [48, 49]. Re-
cently, it was found that in infinite-dimensional systems,
there exists a specific form of quantum states to which the
HJW theorem cannot apply [50]. Basing on this finding,
we proposed a QBC protocol and proved theoretically
that it remains secure against the cheating strategy in
the no-go proofs [51]. Therefore, implementing the pro-
tocol in practice will be of great significance because it
can re-open the venue to many useful multi-party secure
computation protocols that is once closed by the MLC
no-go theorem.
As pointed out in [51], since the protocol requires
infinite-dimensional systems, the implementation may in-
deed be hard if we want to use physical systems with an
infinite number of energy levels, because it may imply an
infinitely high energy. To circumvent the problem, here
we use the arrival time of photon as a trick, so that the
infinite-dimensional systems can be realized using sim-
ple optical devices. Consequently, the QBC protocol in
[51] can be implemented with Mach-Zehnder (MZ) in-
terferometer, which is within the capability of currently
available technology.
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II. THE THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF
THE PROTOCOL
Let us begin with a brief review on the definition of
BC and the theoretical scheme in [51]. BC is a two-party
cryptography between Alice and Bob, which includes the
following phases. In the commit phase, Alice decides
the value of the bit b that she wants to commit, and
sends Bob a piece of evidence, e.g., some quantum states.
Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of
b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. The interval
between the commit and unveil phases can be called the
holding phase. An unconditionally secure BC protocol
needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice cannot change the
value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob
cannot know b before the unveil phase).
In [51] we proposed the following protocol.
Our theoretical QBC protocol:
The commit phase:
(i) Alice decides on the value of b ( b = 0 or 1) that
she wants to commit. Then for j = 1 to s:
She randomly picks an integer ij ∈ {1, 2, ...,∞}, and
sends Bob a quantum register Ψj, which is an infinite-
dimensional system prepared in the state ψbij = (|0〉 +
(−1)b |ij〉)/
√
2.
That is, if b = 0 she randomly picks a state from the
set {
ψ0i ≡ |φi+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |i〉), i = 1, ..., n− 1
}
, (1)
or if b = 1 she randomly picks a state from the set
{
ψ1i ≡ |φi−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |i〉), i = 1, ..., n− 1
}
, (2)
where |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, ... , |i〉, ... are orthogonal to each
other, and n→∞.
Note that in each round, ij is independently chosen,
while b remains the same for all j.
The holding phase:
(ii) Bob stores these s quantum registers unmeasured.
The unveil phase:
2(iii) Alice announces the values of b and all ij ( j =
1, ..., s).
(iv) Bob tries to project each Ψj into the state ψ
b
ij
=
(|0〉+(−1)b |ij〉)/
√
2. If the projections are successful for
all registers, Bob accepts Alice’s commitment. Else if any
of the projections fails, Bob concludes that Alice cheated.
The key reason that this protocol can be uncondition-
ally secure, is the specific forms of states in Eqs. (1)
and (2). In general, the cheating strategy in the no-go
proofs [6–41] can be successful in most QBC protocols
using other forms of states for the following reason. Sup-
pose that honest Alice is supposed to send Bob the state
ψ′0 (ψ′1) if she wants to commit b = 0 (b = 1), where
ψ′0 (ψ′1) is picked from a set of states described by the
density matrix ρβ0 (ρ
β
1 ). Since an unconditionally secure
QBC protocol needs to be concealing against dishonest
Bob, there should be
ρβ0 ≃ ρβ1 (3)
so that Bob cannot discriminate the state himself. Then
the HJW theorem applies. That is, dishonest Alice can
begin the QBC protocol by preparing system α ⊗ β in
such a state that β alone has density matrix ρβ0 . Then she
skips the measurement in the commit phase so that α and
β remain entangled. In the unveil phase, since Eq. (3) is
satisfied, according to the HJW theorem there exist two
measurementsM0 andM1 on α, such that if Alice applies
M0 (M1) on α, then β will collapse to a state belonging
to the set described by ρβ0 (ρ
β
1 ). Therefore, Alice can
unveil b as whatever value she likes in the unveil phase
by choosing between the two measurements M0 and M1.
However, in our protocol the two sets of states take the
forms in Eqs. (1) and (2). Suppose that dishonest Alice
prepares a bipartite system α⊗ β in the state
|Ω〉 = 1√
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
|αi+〉 |φi+〉 (4)
so that she can cheat using the strategy in the no-go
proofs. Here {|αi+〉 , i = 0, ..., n − 1} is an orthonormal
basis of the n-dimensional system α. Let ρβ0 and ρ
β
1 be the
density matrices corresponding to the sets
{
ψ0i = |φi+〉
}
and
{
ψ1i = |φi1〉
}
, respectively. As shown in [50], when
n → ∞ although Eq. (3) is satisfied, the measurements
M0 and M1 on Alice’s system α display an anomalous
result. That is, if Alice wants to collapse β into a state
in
{
ψ0i
}
, the corresponding measurement M0 is to mea-
sure α in the basis {|α1+〉 , |α2+〉 , ...,
∣∣α(n−1)+〉}. Else if
Alice wants to collapse β into a state in
{
ψ1i
}
, the cor-
responding measurement M1 is to measure α in the ba-
sis {− |α1+〉 ,− |α2+〉 , ...,−
∣∣α(n−1)+〉} (see Eq. (28) of
[50]). Since the global negative sign before the state vec-
tors has no physical meaning, the “two” measurements
M0 and M1 are actually the same. Consequently, Alice
no longer has the freedom to choose between two differ-
ent measurements to alter the value of her committed bit
b. Thus the cheating strategy in the no-go proofs fails in
our protocol. Please see [51] for the complete security
proof.
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
To realize our protocol, the most important point is
to find a feasible implementation of the infinite systems.
Here we propose a trick to implement the infinite sys-
tem in each round of the protocol using a single photon
only. The experimental apparatus is illustrated in Fig.
1. In each of the s rounds of step (i) of the protocol, Al-
ice sends a single photon either from the source S0 (for
sending ψ0i ) or S1 (for sending ψ
1
i ). Then it is split into
two wave packets |x〉 and |y〉 by the half-reflected and
half-transmitted beam splitter BSA, which is made of a
half-silvered mirror. |x〉 is sent directly to Bob via path
X while |y〉 is delayed by the storage ring SRA (which
introduces a delay time τ chosen by Alice) before sending
via path Y . At Bob’s site, |x〉 is delayed by the storage
rings SRx and SRB. |y〉 is delayed by the storage ring
SRy which is identical to SRx so that they introduce
the same delay time, then meets |x〉 at the beam split-
ter BSB and interferes. We can see that when the delay
times caused by SRA and SRB are tuned equal, the com-
plete apparatus forms a balanced MZ interferometer, so
that ψ0i (ψ
1
i ) will make the detector D0 (D1) click with
certainty in principle.
Before running the protocol, Bob should use a set of
devices identical to that of Alice’s, to test and determine
the error rate ε of the whole system, i.e., the probability
that the photon ψ0i (ψ
1
i ) sent from the source S0 (S1) will
mistakenly make the detector D1 (D0) click or simply get
lost. Then Alice and Bob run the following experimental
protocol.
Our experimental QBC protocol:
The commit phase:
(i) Alice and Bob agree on a maximum delay time τmax
and the sending times tj ( j = 1, ..., s) with t1 < t2 <
... < ts and τmax < tj − tj−1 ( j = 2, ..., s). Then Alice
decides on the value of b ( b = 0 or 1) that she wants to
commit, and for j = 1 to s:
Alice randomly picks τj ∈ [0, τmax], and sets the delay
time of her storing ring SRA to be τj. Then she sends
Bob a photon Ψj from the source Sb at time tj.
Note that in each round, τj is independently chosen,
while b remains the same for all j.
The holding phase:
(ii) Bob stores each photon in SRx and SRy unmea-
sured.
The unveil phase:
(iii) Alice announces the values of b and all τj ( j =
1, ..., s).
(iv) For j = 1 to s: Bob sets the delay time of his
storing ring SRB to be τj. Then he releases photon Ψj
from SRx and SRy and directs it into his part of the MZ
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FIG. 1: Diagram of the experimental apparatus of our QBC protocol. Alice sends photons from the single-photon source S0
(S1) when she wants to commit b = 0 (b = 1). Both BSA and BSB are half-reflected and half-transmitted beam splitters, and
MA, MB are mirrors. SRA, SRB , SRx and SRy are all storage rings. The photons are finally detected by the detectors D0
and D1.
interferometer (as presented in the green dash-dot box at
the right-hand side of Fig. 1).
If there are totally about (1 − ε)s photons detected by
Db instead of Db¯, then Bob accepts Alice’s commitment.
Otherwise Bob concludes that Alice cheated.
IV. EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
PROTOCOLS
Now we show that the above experimental protocol
is a faithful implementation of the theoretical one. In
the experimental protocol, following the occupation num-
ber representation widely used in quantum optics [52], at
time t if there is a photon on path X and no photon on
path Y , we can denote the state as |1〉X |0〉Y . Or if there
is a photon on path Y and no photon on path X , we can
denote the state as |0〉X |1〉Y . To make the time t more
explicit, let us write them as |t〉X |0〉Y and |0〉X |t〉Y , re-
spectively. That is, we use the symbol t in |...〉 to denote
the time that a single photon presents in the path, in-
stead of the number of photons; and |0〉 means that no
photon is presented in the path at any time. Obviously,
the state |t〉P is orthogonal to |t′〉P (P = X,Y ) for any
t 6= t′ and they are all orthogonal to |0〉P . For simplicity,
suppose that except for SRA, SRB, SRx, and SRy, the
time for the photon to travel through all other devices
in Fig. 1 is negligible. Under this formalism, when Alice
sends the photon Ψj (j = 1, ..., s) from the source Sb at
time tj , the initial state of Ψj after passing BSA is
|Ψj〉ini =
1√
2
(|tj〉X |0〉Y + (−1)b |0〉X |tj〉Y ). (5)
After passing SRA which introduces the delay time τj to
path Y , the state of Ψj that leaves Alice’s site is
|ψj〉A =
1√
2
(|tj〉X |0〉Y + (−1)b |0〉X |tj + τj〉Y ). (6)
In the unveil phase when Bob learns Alice’s delay time
τj and sets SRB accordingly, the final state of the photon
Ψj arriving at BSB after passing SRx, SRy and SRB is
|ψj〉fin =
1√
2
(|tj + τhold + τj〉X |0〉Y
+(−1)b |0〉X |tj + τj + τhold〉Y )
=
1√
2
(
∣∣t′j〉X |0〉Y + (−1)b |0〉X
∣∣t′j〉Y ), (7)
where τhold is the length of the time that Ψj was stored
in SRx and SRy, and
t′j ≡ tj + τhold + τj . (8)
Meanwhile, when combining with BSB , the detectors
D0 and D1 serve as the projective operators
P0 ≡ |ψ〉0 〈ψ|0 (9)
and
P1 ≡ |ψ〉1 〈ψ|1 , (10)
respectively, where
|ψ〉0 ≡
1√
2
(|tB〉X |0〉Y + |0〉X |tB〉Y ) (11)
and
|ψ〉1 ≡
1√
2
(|tB〉X |0〉Y − |0〉X |tB〉Y ) (12)
with tB denoting the time that Bob applies the measure-
ment. Therefore, if Bob takes tB = t
′
j , then the detector
Db should click with certainty where b is Alice’s commit-
ted bit. Otherwise he knows that Alice cheats.
To see that the above presentation of the states is
equivalent to that in our theoretical QBC protocol, let
us view the time range [0, τmax] (within which Alice picks
4her delay time τj) as a series of time slot T1, T2, ..., Ti,
..., Tn−1. Here 0 ≤ Ti ≤ τmax (i = 1, ..., n − 1), and
Ti 6= Ti′ for any i 6= i′. When time can be treated as a
continuous variable, there is infinite choices for Ti, i.e.,
n→∞. Now for each Ψj (j = 1, ..., s), let us define
|0〉 ≡ |tj〉X |0〉Y (13)
and
|i〉 ≡ |0〉X |tj + Ti〉Y . (14)
It is easy to verify that 〈i′ |i〉 = δi′i. That is, a single
photon Ψj can be treated as an n-dimensional system,
with {|i〉 , i = 0, ..., n− 1} being an orthonormal basis.
With these newly defined |0〉 and |i〉, we can see that in
the experimental protocol, when Alice chooses the delay
time as τj = Ti (i = 1, ..., n−1), Eq. (6) can be rewritten
as
|ψj〉A =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)b |i〉). (15)
This is exactly the state that Alice sends in step (i) of the
theoretical protocol for committing the bit b, as shown by
Eqs. (1) and (2). Thus, it is proven that our proposed ex-
perimental protocol is equivalent to the theoretical one,
so that the security proof in [51] also applies. Conse-
quently, the experimental protocol is secure as long as
time can be treated as a continuous variable so that the
condition n→∞ can be reached.
V. FEASIBILITY AND COMPARISON WITH
EXPERIMENTAL RELATIVISTIC BC
PROTOCOLS
The experiment apparatus shown in Fig. 1 is much the
same as those of the quantum key distribution (QKD)
and quantum private query protocols in [52–54]. The
only difference is that our protocol requires two more
storage rings SRx and SRy. The QKD protocol in [52]
was already realized experimentally in [55]. By compar-
ing our apparatus with Fig. 1 of [55], we can see that
the technology in [55] is sufficient for implementing our
protocol too. Detailed description of the actual experi-
mental devices can be found in section III of [55].
The most challenging part is to find storage rings SRx
and SRy with a sufficiently long delay time, because they
determine the holding time (the time interval between the
commit phase and the unveil phase) of the protocol. Us-
ing 150km optical fiber (which was proven to be able to
guarantee sufficiently high key rate for QKD in practice)
to make the storage ring can generate about 500µs delay
time. As far as we know, currently there are also com-
mercial optical delay devices which can provide 1000µs
delay time.
While such a holding time seems short, it is compet-
itive with existing experimental schemes for relativis-
tic BC [56, 57]. To this day, these two relativistic BC
schemes are the only experimental implementations of
BC which are known to be unconditionally secure (in-
stead of computationally secure or conditionally secure,
where the security has to rely on computational assump-
tions or imperfections of experimental devices instead of
the validity of fundamental principles alone). In the
experiment of [57], the holding time is merely 30µs.
The scheme in [56] managed to reach a holding time of
15.6ms, but Alice and Bob have to be separated from
their agents by a straight-line distance d = 9354km. In
general, the holding time in [56] is limited to d/2c, where
d is the distance between Alice/Bob and their agents,
and it has to be the straight-line distance otherwise the
participants could cheat. Therefore, when the partici-
pants are close to each other in space, the holding time
will be very short. For example, when d = 10km, the
holding time will be 17µs only. On the contrary, in our
protocol Alice and Bob are not required to be separated
far from each other. The 500˜1000µs holding time can
be achieved at any distance.
Moreover, in all relativistic BC (including [56, 57]),
Alice and Bob have to be associated by their “agents”
so that the protocol is actually not a two-party protocol
anymore. But our protocol does not require agents, thus
it satisfies the definition of BC rigorously.
VI. SUMMARY
We showed that as long as time can be treated as a
continuous variable, then each infinite-dimensional sys-
tem in the unconditionally secure QBC protocol proposed
in [51] can be realized using a single photon. Thus we
obtained an experimental implementation of this QBC
protocol which is feasible under currently available tech-
nology, with a holding time competitive with existing
experimental relativistic BC schemes.
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